25 citations · 55 across the 19 of their papers we have counts for
22 papers
Knapsack Secretary is not -Competitive
Marius Garbea, Rishi Patel, Emmanouil Pountourakis
We prove that no algorithm for the knapsack secretary problem can be -competitive. The knapsack secretary problem was first introduced by Babaioff, Immorlica, Kempe, and Klein…
Repeated Sales with Heterogeneous Buyer Sophistication
Rishi Patel, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Samuel Taggart
This paper considers behavior-based price discrimination in the repeated sale of a non-durable good to a single long-lived buyer, by a seller without commitment power. We assume th…
Polynomial-Time Approximation Schemes via Utility Alignment: Unit-Demand Pricing and More
Robin Bowers, Marius Garbea, Emmanouil Pountourakis +1
This paper derives polynomial-time approximation schemes for several NP-hard stochastic optimization problems from the algorithmic mechanism design and operations research literatu…
The Price of Pessimism for Automated Defense
Erick Galinkin, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Spiros Mancoridis
The well-worn George Box aphorism ``all models are wrong, but some are useful'' is particularly salient in the cybersecurity domain, where the assumptions built into a model can ha…
Simple Delegated Choice
Ali Khodabakhsh, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Samuel Taggart
This paper studies delegation in a model of discrete choice. In the delegation problem, an uninformed principal must consult an informed agent to make a decision. Both the agent an…
An impossibility result for strongly group-strategyproof multi-winner approval-based voting
Ioannis Caragiannis, Rob LeGrand, Evangelos Markakis +1
Multi-winner approval-based voting has received considerable attention recently. A voting rule in this setting takes as input ballots in which each agent approves a subset of the a…
Simulation of Attacker Defender Interaction in a Noisy Security Game
Erick Galinkin, Emmanouil Pountourakis, John Carter +1
In the cybersecurity setting, defenders are often at the mercy of their detection technologies and subject to the information and experiences that individual analysts have. In orde…
Optimal Data Acquisition with Privacy-Aware Agents
Rachel Cummings, Hadi Elzayn, Vasilis Gkatzelis +2
We study the problem faced by a data analyst or platform that wishes to collect private data from privacy-aware agents. To incentivize participation, in exchange for this data, the…
Single-Sample Prophet Inequalities via Greedy-Ordered Selection
Constantine Caramanis, Paul Dütting, Matthew Faw +6
We study single-sample prophet inequalities (SSPIs), i.e., prophet inequalities where only a single sample from each prior distribution is available. Besides a direct, and optimal,…
Eliciting Truthful Reports with Partial Signals in Repeated Games
Yutong Wu, Ali Khodabakhsh, Bo Li +2
We consider a repeated game where a player self-reports her usage of a service and is charged a payment accordingly by a center. The center observes a partial signal, representing…
Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Rishi Patel, Emmanouil Pountourakis +1
We study the problem of selling a good to a group of bidders with interdependent values in a prior-free setting. Each bidder has a signal that can take one of different values,…
Resource-Aware Cost-Sharing Mechanisms with Priors
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Alkmini Sgouritsa
In a decentralized system with machines, we study the selfish scheduling problem where each user strategically chooses which machine to use. Each machine incurs a cost, which i…
Single-Sample Prophet Inequalities Revisited
Constantine Caramanis, Matthew Faw, Orestis Papadigenopoulos +1
The study of the prophet inequality problem in the limited information regime was initiated by Azar et al. [SODA'14] in the pursuit of prior-independent posted-price mechanisms. As…
Electric Vehicle Valet
Ali Khodabakhsh, Orestis Papadigenopoulos, Jannik Matuschke +3
We propose a novel way to use Electric Vehicles (EVs) as dynamic mobile energy storage with the goal to support grid balancing during peak load times. EVs seeking parking in a busy…
Optimal Mechanism Design with Risk-loving Agents
Evdokia Nikolova, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Ger Yang
One of the most celebrated results in mechanism design is Myerson's characterization of the revenue optimal auction for selling a single item. However, this result relies heavily o…
A Submodular Approach for Electricity Distribution Network Reconfiguration
Ali Khodabakhsh, Ger Yang, Soumya Basu +4
Distribution network reconfiguration (DNR) is a tool used by operators to balance line load flows and mitigate losses. As distributed generation and flexible load adoption increase…
Revenue Maximization with an Uncertainty-Averse Buyer
Shuchi Chawla, Kira Goldner, J. Benjamin Miller +1
Most work in mechanism design assumes that buyers are risk neutral; some considers risk aversion arising due to a non-linear utility for money. Yet behavioral studies have establis…
Procrastination with variable present bias
Nick Gravin, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier +1
Individuals working towards a goal often exhibit time inconsistent behavior, making plans and then failing to follow through. One well-known model of such behavioral anomalies is p…
Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing
Saeed Alaei, Jason Hartline, Rad Niazadeh +2
For selling a single item to agents with independent but non-identically distributed values, the revenue optimal auction is complex. With respect to it, Hartline and Roughgarden (2…
Socially stable matchings in the Hospitals / Residents problem
Georgios Askalidis, Nicole Immorlica, Augustine Kwanashie +2
In the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem, agents are partitioned into hospitals and residents. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preferen…
Socially Stable Matchings
Georgios Askalidis, Nicole Immorlica, Emmanouil Pountourakis
In two-sided matching markets, the agents are partitioned into two sets. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potenti…
A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing
Emmanouil Pountourakis, Angelina Vidali
We study the problem of designing group-strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms. The players report their bids for getting serviced and the mechanism decides which players are going…