10 citations · 18 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
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cs.GT2013★ 4 cited
Socially stable matchings in the Hospitals / Residents problem
Georgios Askalidis, Nicole Immorlica, Augustine Kwanashie +2
In the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem, agents are partitioned into hospitals and residents. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preferen…
cs.GT2013★ 2 cited
Socially Stable Matchings
Georgios Askalidis, Nicole Immorlica, Emmanouil Pountourakis
In two-sided matching markets, the agents are partitioned into two sets. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potenti…