12 citations · 52 across the 25 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
Randomized Social Choice Functions Under Metric Preferences
Elliot Anshelevich, John Postl
We determine the quality of randomized social choice mechanisms in a setting in which the agents have metric preferences: every agent has a cost for each alternative, and these cos…
Blind, Greedy, and Random: Ordinal Approximation Algorithms for Matching and Clustering
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
We study Matching and other related problems in a partial information setting where the agents' utilities for being matched to other agents are hidden and the mechanism only has ac…
Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
Consider a setting where selfish agents are to be assigned to coalitions or projects from a fixed set P. Each project k is characterized by a valuation function; v_k(S) is the valu…
Envy-Free Pricing in Large Markets: Approximating Revenue and Welfare
Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar, Shreyas Sekar
We study the classic setting of envy-free pricing, in which a single seller chooses prices for its many items, with the goal of maximizing revenue once the items are allocated. Des…