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20132026
most citedAwareness of Voter Passion Greatly Improves the Distortion of Metric Social Choice

7 citations · 10 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for

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cs.GT2026

Hotelling-Downs with Facility Synergy: The Mall Effect

Elliot Anshelevich, Jianan Lin, Noah Prisament

We consider a variation of the classic Hotelling-Downs model with the addition of facility synergies. Unlike in the classic model, where clients always use the facility closest to…

cs.GT2026

Strategic Facility Location with Limited Liars

Yue Gruszecki, Elliot Anshelevich

We study Nash equilibria in strategic facility location games where clients are located in an arbitrary metric space. Specifically, there are clients, and the goal is to choose…

cs.GT2024

Metric Distortion of Line-up Elections: The Right Person for the Right Job

Christopher Jerrett, Yue Han, Elliot Anshelevich

We provide mechanisms and new metric distortion bounds for line-up elections. In such elections, a set of voters, candidates, and positions are all located in a metr…

cs.GT2024

Metric Distortion under Group-Fair Objectives

Georgios Amanatidis, Elliot Anshelevich, Christopher Jerrett +1

We consider a voting problem in which a set of agents have metric preferences over a set of alternatives, and are also partitioned into disjoint groups. Given information about the…

cs.GT20231 cited

Improved Metric Distortion via Threshold Approvals

Elliot Anshelevich, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Christopher Jerrett +1

We consider a social choice setting in which agents and alternatives are represented by points in a metric space, and the cost of an agent for an alternative is the distance betwee…

cs.GT2021

The Distortion of Distributed Metric Social Choice

Elliot Anshelevich, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A. Voudouris

We consider a social choice setting with agents that are partitioned into disjoint groups, and have metric preferences over a set of alternatives. Our goal is to choose a single al…