26 citations · 44 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
13 papers
Deterministic Refund Mechanisms
Saeed Alaei, Shuchi Chawla, Zhiyi Huang +2
We consider a mechanism design setting with a single item and a single buyer who is uncertain about the value of the item. Both the buyer and the seller have a common model for the…
On Three-Layer Data Markets
Alireza Fallah, Michael I. Jordan, Ali Makhdoumi +1
We study a three-layer data market comprising users (data owners), platforms, and a data buyer. Each user benefits from platform services in exchange for data, incurring privacy lo…
The Limits of Price Discrimination Under Privacy Constraints
Alireza Fallah, Michael I. Jordan, Ali Makhdoumi +1
We study a producer's problem of selling a product to a continuum of privacy-conscious consumers, where the producer can implement third-degree price discrimination, offering diffe…
Descending Price Auctions with Bounded Number of Price Levels and Batched Prophet Inequality
Saeed Alaei, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian +1
We consider descending price auctions for selling units of a good to unit demand i.i.d. buyers where there is an exogenous bound of on the number of price levels the auctio…
Optimal and Differentially Private Data Acquisition: Central and Local Mechanisms
Alireza Fallah, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian +1
We consider a platform's problem of collecting data from privacy sensitive users to estimate an underlying parameter of interest. We formulate this question as a Bayesian-optimal m…
Strategic Dynamic Pricing with Network Effects
Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian, Asuman Ozdaglar
We study the optimal pricing strategy of a monopolist selling homogeneous goods to customers over multiple periods. The customers choose their time of purchase to maximize their pa…
Informational Braess' Paradox: The Effect of Information on Traffic Congestion
Daron Acemoglu, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian +1
To systematically study the implications of additional information about routes provided to certain users (e.g., via GPS-based route guidance systems), we introduce a new class of…
On Random Sampling Auctions for Digital Goods
Saeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian, Aravind Srinivasan
In the context of auctions for digital goods, an interesting random sampling auction has been proposed by Goldberg, Hartline, and Wright [2001]. This auction has been analyzed by F…
The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions
Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah +1
The intuition that profit is optimized by maximizing marginal revenue is a guiding principle in microeconomics. In the classical auction theory for agents with linear utility and s…
Bayesian Optimal Auctions via Multi- to Single-agent Reduction
Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah +2
We study an abstract optimal auction problem for a single good or service. This problem includes environments where agents have budgets, risk preferences, or multi-dimensional pref…
Bayesian Mechanism Design for Budget-Constrained Agents
Shuchi Chawla, David Malec, Azarakhsh Malekian
We study Bayesian mechanism design problems in settings where agents have budgets. Specifically, an agent's utility for an outcome is given by his value for the outcome minus any p…
Maximizing Sequence-Submodular Functions and its Application to Online Advertising
Saeed Alaei, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian
Motivated by applications in online advertising, we consider a class of maximization problems where the objective is a function of the sequence of actions as well as the running du…
Competitive Equilibria in Two Sided Matching Markets with Non-transferable Utilities
Saeed Alaei, Kamal Jain, Azarakhsh Malekian
We consider two sided matching markets consisting of agents with non-transferable utilities; agents from the opposite sides form matching pairs (e.g., buyers-sellers) and negotiate…