100 citations · 155 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for
12 papers
Deterministic Refund Mechanisms
Saeed Alaei, Shuchi Chawla, Zhiyi Huang +2
We consider a mechanism design setting with a single item and a single buyer who is uncertain about the value of the item. Both the buyer and the seller have a common model for the…
Descending Price Auctions with Bounded Number of Price Levels and Batched Prophet Inequality
Saeed Alaei, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian +1
We consider descending price auctions for selling units of a good to unit demand i.i.d. buyers where there is an exogenous bound of on the number of price levels the auctio…
Response Prediction for Low-Regret Agents
Saeed Alaei, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Mohammad Mahdian +1
Companies like Google and Microsoft run billions of auctions every day to sell advertising opportunities. Any change to the rules of these auctions can have a tremendous effect on…
Computing Equilibrium in Matching Markets
Saeed Alaei, Pooya Jalaly, Eva Tardos
Market equilibria of matching markets offer an intuitive and fair solution for matching problems without money with agents who have preferences over the items. Such a matching mark…
Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing
Saeed Alaei, Jason Hartline, Rad Niazadeh +2
For selling a single item to agents with independent but non-identically distributed values, the revenue optimal auction is complex. With respect to it, Hartline and Roughgarden (2…
On Random Sampling Auctions for Digital Goods
Saeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian, Aravind Srinivasan
In the context of auctions for digital goods, an interesting random sampling auction has been proposed by Goldberg, Hartline, and Wright [2001]. This auction has been analyzed by F…
The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions
Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah +1
The intuition that profit is optimized by maximizing marginal revenue is a guiding principle in microeconomics. In the classical auction theory for agents with linear utility and s…
Bayesian Optimal Auctions via Multi- to Single-agent Reduction
Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah +2
We study an abstract optimal auction problem for a single good or service. This problem includes environments where agents have budgets, risk preferences, or multi-dimensional pref…
AdCell: Ad Allocation in Cellular Networks
Saeed Alaei, Mohammad T. Hajiaghayi, Vahid Liaghat +2
With more than four billion usage of cellular phones worldwide, mobile advertising has become an attractive alternative to online advertisements. In this paper, we propose a new ta…
Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers
Saeed Alaei
For Bayesian combinatorial auctions, we present a general framework for approximately reducing the mechanism design problem for multiple buyers to single buyer sub-problems. Our fr…
Maximizing Sequence-Submodular Functions and its Application to Online Advertising
Saeed Alaei, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian
Motivated by applications in online advertising, we consider a class of maximization problems where the objective is a function of the sequence of actions as well as the running du…
Competitive Equilibria in Two Sided Matching Markets with Non-transferable Utilities
Saeed Alaei, Kamal Jain, Azarakhsh Malekian
We consider two sided matching markets consisting of agents with non-transferable utilities; agents from the opposite sides form matching pairs (e.g., buyers-sellers) and negotiate…