3 papers
cs.GT2026
Optimal Mediation Mechanism in Bilateral Trade
Zhikang Fan, Weiran Shen, Shaojie Tang +1
We study the problem of designing revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a selfish mediator who facilitates trade between a buyer and a seller. We consider a setting where the mediator…
cs.GT2024
Optimal Fixed-Price Mechanism with Signaling
Zhikang Fan, Weiran Shen
Consider a trade market with one seller and multiple buyers. The seller aims to sell an indivisible item and maximize their revenue. This paper focuses on a simple and popular mech…
cs.GT2024
Selling an Item through Persuasion
Zhikang Fan, Weiran Shen
A monopolistic seller aims to sell an indivisible item to multiple potential buyers. Each buyer's valuation depends on their private type and the item's quality. The seller can obs…