4 papers
Optimal Mediation Mechanism in Bilateral Trade
Zhikang Fan, Weiran Shen, Shaojie Tang +1
We study the problem of designing revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a selfish mediator who facilitates trade between a buyer and a seller. We consider a setting where the mediator…
Optimal Fixed-Price Mechanism with Signaling
Zhikang Fan, Weiran Shen
Consider a trade market with one seller and multiple buyers. The seller aims to sell an indivisible item and maximize their revenue. This paper focuses on a simple and popular mech…
Selling an Item through Persuasion
Zhikang Fan, Weiran Shen
A monopolistic seller aims to sell an indivisible item to multiple potential buyers. Each buyer's valuation depends on their private type and the item's quality. The seller can obs…
Revenue Maximization Mechanisms for an Uninformed Mediator with Communication Abilities
Zhikang Fan, Weiran Shen
Consider a market where a seller owns an item for sale and a buyer wants to purchase it. Each player has private information, known as their type. It can be costly and difficult fo…