6 papers
Online Multi-Agent Contracts
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur +1
We introduce and study an online variant of the multi-agent contract model. In our model, agents arrive one-by-one and are active with a certain probability. Upon arrival of agent…
Equal-Pay Contracts
Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka +1
We study multi-agent contract design, where a principal incentivizes a team of agents to take costly actions that jointly determine the project success via a combinatorial reward f…
Fair Division via Resource Augmentation
Hannaneh Akrami, Siddharth Barman, Alon Eden +5
We introduce and formalize the notion of resource augmentation for maximin share (MMS) fairness for the allocation of indivisible goods. Given an instance with agents and g…
One Action Too Many: Inapproximability of Budgeted Combinatorial Contracts
Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka +1
We study multi-agent contract design with combinatorial actions, under budget constraints, and for a broad class of objective functions, including profit (principal's utility), rew…
When Contracts Get Complex: Information-Theoretic Barriers
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur +1
In the combinatorial-action contract model (Dütting et al., FOCS'21) a principal delegates the execution of a complex project to an agent, who can choose any subset from a given s…
Budget-Feasible Contracts
Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka +1
The problem of computing near-optimal contracts in combinatorial settings has recently attracted significant interest in the computer science community. Previous work has provided…