5 papers
The New Mathematics of Democracy
Bailey Flanigan, Ismar Volic
This article surveys emerging directions in the mathematics of democracy. It uses three case studies --- voting theory, participatory budgeting, and deliberative democracy --- to h…
Candidate Moderation under Instant Runoff and Condorcet Voting: Evidence from the Cooperative Election Study
David McCune, Matthew I. Jones, Andy Schultz +5
This article extends the analysis of Atkinson, Foley, and Ganz in "Beyond the Spoiler Effect: Can Ranked-Choice Voting Solve the Problem of Political Polarization?". Their work use…
BallotRank: A Condorcet Completion Method for Graphs
Jason Douglas Todd, Ismar Volic
We introduce BallotRank, a ranked preference aggregation method derived from a modified PageRank algorithm. It is a Condorcet-consistent method without damping, and empirical exami…
Weighted simple games and the topology of simplicial complexes
Anastasia Brooks, Franjo Sarcevic, Ismar Volic
We use simplicial complexes to model simple games as well as weighted voting games where certain coalitions are considered impossible. Topological characterizations of various idea…
The topology of simple games
Ismar Volic, Leah Valentiner
We initiate the study of simple games from the point of view of combinatorial topology. The starting premise is that the losing coalitions of a simple game can be identified with a…