4 papers
Algorithmic Collusion at Test Time: A Meta-game Design and Evaluation
Yuhong Luo, Daniel Schoepflin, Xintong Wang
The threat of algorithmic collusion, and whether it merits regulatory intervention, remains debated, as existing evaluations of its emergence often rely on long learning horizons,…
Strategyproof Tournament Rules for Teams with a Constant Degree of Selfishness
David Pennock, Daniel Schoepflin, Kangning Wang
We revisit the well-studied problem of designing fair and manipulation-resistant tournament rules. In this problem, we seek a mechanism that (probabilistically) identifies the winn…
Multi-Parameter Mechanisms for Consumer Surplus Maximization
Tomer Ezra, Daniel Schoepflin, Ariel Shaulker
We consider the problem of designing auctions which maximize consumer surplus (i.e., the social welfare minus the payments charged to the buyers). In the consumer surplus maximizat…
On the Power of Randomization for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
Shiri Ron, Daniel Schoepflin
We investigate the problem of designing randomized obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanisms in several canonical auction settings. Obvious strategy-proofness, introduced by Li [Am…