7 papers
Characterizations of voting rules based on majority margins
Yifeng Ding, Wesley H. Holliday, Eric Pacuit
In the context of voting with ranked ballots, an important class of voting rules is the class of margin-based rules (also called pairwise rules). A voting rule is margin-based if w…
Stable Voting and the Splitting of Cycles
Wesley H. Holliday, Milan Mossé, Chase Norman +2
Algorithms for resolving majority cycles in preference aggregation have been studied extensively in computational social choice. Several sophisticated cycle-resolving methods, incl…
An extension of May's Theorem to three alternatives: axiomatizing Minimax voting
Wesley H. Holliday, Eric Pacuit
May's Theorem [K. O. May, Econometrica 20 (1952) 680-684] characterizes majority voting on two alternatives as the unique preferential voting method satisfying several simple axiom…
An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting
Wesley H. Holliday
In social choice theory with ordinal preferences, a voting method satisfies the axiom of positive involvement if adding to a preference profile a voter who ranks an alternative uni…
Learning to Manipulate under Limited Information
Wesley H. Holliday, Alexander Kristoffersen, Eric Pacuit
By classic results in social choice theory, any reasonable preferential voting method sometimes gives individuals an incentive to report an insincere preference. The extent to whic…
Social Choice Should Guide AI Alignment in Dealing with Diverse Human Feedback
Vincent Conitzer, Rachel Freedman, Jobst Heitzig +9
Foundation models such as GPT-4 are fine-tuned to avoid unsafe or otherwise problematic behavior, such as helping to commit crimes or producing racist text. One approach to fine-tu…