3 papers
cs.GT2026
Steering No-Regret Learners to a Desired Equilibrium
Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagnostides +7
A mediator observes no-regret learners playing an extensive-form game repeatedly across rounds. The mediator attempts to steer players toward some desirable predetermined equil…
cs.GT2026
Faster Game Solving via Hyperparameter Schedules
Naifeng Zhang, Stephen McAleer, Tuomas Sandholm
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) algorithms are a foundational class of methods for solving imperfect-information games, with the time average of their iterates converging…
cs.GT2025
Automated Design of Affine Maximizer Mechanisms in Dynamic Settings
Michael Curry, Vinzenz Thoma, Darshan Chakrabarti +5
Dynamic mechanism design is a challenging extension to ordinary mechanism design in which the mechanism designer must make a sequence of decisions over time in the face of possibly…