28 citations · 44 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
2 papers
cs.GT2014★ 28 cited
Trust-Based Mechanisms for Robust and Efficient Task Allocation in the Presence of Execution Uncertainty
Sarvapali Dyanand Ramchurn, Claudio Mezzetti, Andrea Giovannucci +3
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms are often used to allocate tasks to selfish and rational agents. VCG mechanisms are incentive compatible, direct mechanisms that are efficien…
cs.GT2014★ 16 cited
Optimal Strategies for Simultaneous Vickrey Auctions with Perfect Substitutes
Enrico H. Gerding, Rajdeep Kumar Dash, Andrew Byde +1
We derive optimal strategies for a bidding agent that participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We prove that, if everyone else bids lo…