2 citations · 2 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
On the Complexity of Dynamic Mechanism Design
Christos Papadimitriou, George Pierrakos, Christos-Alexandros Psomas +1
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. T…
Efficiency-Revenue Trade-offs in Auctions
Ilias Diakonikolas, Christos Papadimitriou, George Pierrakos +1
When agents with independent priors bid for a single item, Myerson's optimal auction maximizes expected revenue, whereas Vickrey's second-price auction optimizes social welfare. We…
Optimal Deterministic Auctions with Correlated Priors
Christos Papadimitriou, George Pierrakos
We revisit the problem of designing the profit-maximizing single-item auction, solved by Myerson in his seminal paper for the case in which bidder valuations are independently dist…