3 papers
cs.GT2026
Beyond Winner-Take-All Procurement Auctions
Pranav Garimidi, Michael Neuder, Tim Roughgarden
Blockchain protocols often seek to procure computationally challenging work from a decentralized set of participants. While there are simple procurement auctions that result in the…
cs.CR2025
Multiple Concurrent Proposers: Why and How
Pranav Garimidi, Joachim Neu, Max Resnick
Traditional single-proposer blockchains suffer from miner extractable value (MEV), where validators exploit their serial monopoly on transaction inclusion and ordering to extract r…
cs.GT2025
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for Leaderless Blockchain Protocols
Pranav Garimidi, Lioba Heimbach, Tim Roughgarden
We initiate the study of transaction fee mechanism design for blockchain protocols in which multiple block producers contribute to the production of each block. Our contributions i…