57 citations · 69 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers
Econometrics for Learning Agents
Denis Nekipelov, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos
The main goal of this paper is to develop a theory of inference of player valuations from observed data in the generalized second price auction without relying on the Nash equilibr…
The Price of Anarchy in Large Games
Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier +2
Game-theoretic models relevant for computer science applications usually feature a large number of players. The goal of this paper is to develop an analytical framework for boundin…
Greedy Algorithms make Efficient Mechanisms
Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis
We study mechanisms that use greedy allocation rules and pay-your-bid pricing to allocate resources subject to a matroid constraint. We show that all such mechanisms obtain a const…
Price of Stability in Games of Incomplete Information
Vasilis Syrgkanis
We address the question of whether price of stability results (existence of equilibria with low social cost) are robust to incomplete information. We show that this is the case in…
Bayesian Sequential Auctions
Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos
In many natural settings agents participate in multiple different auctions that are not simultaneous. In such auctions, future opportunities affect strategic considerations of the…
Bayesian Games and the Smoothness Framework
Vasilis Syrgkanis
We consider a general class of Bayesian Games where each players utility depends on his type (possibly multidimensional) and on the strategy profile and where players' types are di…