activity
20102015
most citedTight Bounds for the Price of Anarchy of Simultaneous First Price Auctions

2 citations · 3 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

6 papers

cs.GT2015★ 1 cited

On the Efficiency of All-Pay Mechanisms

George Christodoulou, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Bo Tang

We study the inefficiency of mixed equilibria, expressed as the price of anarchy, of all-pay auctions in three different environments: combinatorial, multi-unit and single-item auc…

cs.GT2015

On the Efficiency of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism for Divisible Resources

George Christodoulou, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Bo Tang

We study the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism, that is widely used to allocate divisible resources. Each agent submits a bid for each divisible resource and rece…

cs.GT2013★ 2 cited

Tight Bounds for the Price of Anarchy of Simultaneous First Price Auctions

George Christodoulou, Annamária Kovács, Alkmini Sgouritsa +1

We study the Price of Anarchy of simultaneous first-price auctions for buyers with submodular and subadditive valuations. The current best upper bounds for the Bayesian Price of An…

cs.GT2013

Pricing Ad Slots with Consecutive Multi-unit Demand

Xiaotie Deng, Paul Goldberg, Yang Sun +2

We consider the optimal pricing problem for a model of the rich media advertisement market, as well as other related applications. In this market, there are multiple buyers (advert…

cs.DS2011

The Simulated Greedy Algorithm for Several Submodular Matroid Secretary Problems

Tengyu Ma, Bo Tang, Yajun Wang

We study the matroid secretary problems with submodular valuation functions. In these problems, the elements arrive in random order. When one element arrives, we have to make an im…

cs.GT2010

Optimal Pricing in Social Networks with Incomplete Information

Wei Chen, Pinyan Lu, Xiaorui Sun +3

In revenue maximization of selling a digital product in a social network, the utility of an agent is often considered to have two parts: a private valuation, and linearly additive…