4 papers
Optimal Pricing with Unreliable Signals
Zhihao Gavin Tang, Yixin Tao, Shixin Wang
We study a single-buyer pricing problem with unreliable side information, motivated by the increasing use of AI-assisted decision-making and LLM-based predictions. The seller obser…
Robust Mechanism Design with Anonymous Information
Zhihao Gavin Tang, Shixin Wang
In practice, auction data are often endogenously censored and anonymous, revealing only limited outcome statistics rather than full bid profiles. We study robust auction design whe…
Pricing with a Hidden Sample
Zhihao Gavin Tang, Yixin Tao, Shixin Wang
We study prior-independent pricing for selling a single item to a single buyer when the seller observes only a single sample from the valuation distribution, while the buyer knows…
Multi-Item Screening with a Maximin-Ratio Objective
Shixin Wang
In multi-item screening, optimal selling mechanisms are challenging to characterize and implement, even with full knowledge of valuation distributions. In this paper, we aim to dev…