6 citations · 14 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
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cs.GT2016★ 1 cited
Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
We study truthful mechanisms for matching and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agents' true utilities are hidden, and the algorithm only has access to o…
cs.GT2016★ 1 cited
Pricing to Maximize Revenue and Welfare Simultaneously in Large Markets
Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar, Shreyas Sekar
We study large markets with a single seller which can produce many types of goods, and many multi-minded buyers. The seller chooses posted prices for its many items, and the buyers…