6 citations · 13 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
We study truthful mechanisms for matching and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agents' true utilities are hidden, and the algorithm only has access to o…
Pricing to Maximize Revenue and Welfare Simultaneously in Large Markets
Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar, Shreyas Sekar
We study large markets with a single seller which can produce many types of goods, and many multi-minded buyers. The seller chooses posted prices for its many items, and the buyers…
Approximate Equilibrium and Incentivizing Social Coordination
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consid…
Friendship, Altruism, and Reward Sharing in Stable Matching and Contribution Games
Elliot Anshelevich, Onkar Bhardwaj, Martin Hoefer
We study stable matching problems in networks where players are embedded in a social context, and may incorporate friendship relations or altruism into their decisions. Each player…