10 citations · 17 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers
Online Information Acquisition: Hiring Multiple Agents
Federico Cacciamani, Matteo Castiglioni, Nicola Gatti
We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires \emph{multiple} agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the informat…
Bidding Strategies for Proportional Representation in Advertisement Campaigns
Inbal Livni Navon, Charlotte Peale, Omer Reingold +1
Many companies rely on advertising platforms such as Google, Facebook, or Instagram to recruit a large and diverse applicant pool for job openings. Prior works have shown that equi…
Optimal Rates and Efficient Algorithms for Online Bayesian Persuasion
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli +3
Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the on…
Online Mechanism Design for Information Acquisition
Federico Cacciamani, Matteo Castiglioni, Nicola Gatti
We study the problem of designing mechanisms for \emph{information acquisition} scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed \emph{receiver} and a set…
Selling Information while Being an Interested Party
Matteo Castiglioni, Francesco Bacchiocchi, Alberto Marchesi +2
We study the algorithmic problem faced by an information holder (seller) who wants to optimally sell such information to a budged-constrained decision maker (buyer) that has to und…
Multi-Agent Contract Design: How to Commission Multiple Agents with Individual Outcome
Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, Nicola Gatti
We study hidden-action principal-agent problems with multiple agents. These are problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme in order to incentivize…