10 citations · 33 across the 32 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
Proportionally Fair Online Allocation of Public Goods with Predictions
Siddhartha Banerjee, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Safwan Hossain +3
We design online algorithms for the fair allocation of public goods to a set of agents over a sequence of rounds and focus on improving their performance using predictions.…
Optimal Data Acquisition with Privacy-Aware Agents
Rachel Cummings, Hadi Elzayn, Vasilis Gkatzelis +2
We study the problem faced by a data analyst or platform that wishes to collect private data from privacy-aware agents. To incentivize participation, in exchange for this data, the…
Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions
Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan
In their seminal paper that initiated the field of algorithmic mechanism design, \citet{NR99} studied the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for scheduling jobs on unrel…
Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Kostas Kollias, Alkmini Sgouritsa +1
A central goal in algorithmic game theory is to analyze the performance of decentralized multiagent systems, like communication and information networks. In the absence of a centra…
Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location
Priyank Agrawal, Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis +2
In this work we introduce an alternative model for the design and analysis of strategyproof mechanisms that is motivated by the recent surge of work in "learning-augmented algorith…
Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions
Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin +1
In a single-parameter mechanism design problem, a provider is looking to sell a service to a group of potential buyers. Each buyer has a private value for receiving the s…