10 citations · 33 across the 32 of their papers we have counts for
36 papers · 1 filter
Forging Self-Funded Marketplaces among Strategic Agents
Yuan Deng, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan +2
We introduce the problem of designing mechanisms that incentivize strategic agents to form self-funded marketplaces. In our model, if agent exerts effort , they i…
Metric Facility Assignment with Partial Information
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Hasti Karimi, Emma Rewinski +2
We study an assignment problem where a set of agents and a set of facilities lie on a line metric. The goal is to compute an assignment of agents to facilities to approximately min…
The Distortion of Prior-Independent b-Matching Mechanisms
Ioannis Caragiannis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Sebastian Homrighausen
In a setting where items need to be partitioned among agents, we evaluate the performance of mechanisms that take as input each agent's \emph{ordinal preferences}, i.e., th…
Procurement Auctions with Predictions: Improved Frugality for Facility Location
Eric Balkanski, Nicholas DeFilippis, Vasilis Gkatzelis +1
We study the problem of designing procurement auctions for the strategic uncapacitated facility location problem: a company needs to procure a set of facility locations in order to…
Procurement Auctions with Best and Final Offers
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Randolph Preston McAfee, Renato Paes Leme
We study sequential procurement auctions where the sellers are provided with a ``best and final offer'' (BAFO) strategy. This strategy allows each seller to effectively ``freez…
Optimal Metric Distortion for Matching on the Line
Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Mohamad Latifian +2
We study the distortion of one-sided and two-sided matching problems on the line. In the one-sided case, agents need to be matched to items, and each agent's cost in a matc…