34 citations · 135 across the 43 of their papers we have counts for
12 papers · 1 filter
Learning to Price with Persuasion
Maria-Florina Balcan, Tejas Pagare, Karan Singh
Motivated by modern marketplaces, where the platform or the seller routinely gathers detailed user profiles, we study a novel learning theoretic model that simultaneously involves…
The Complexity of Proper Equilibrium in Extensive-Form and Polytope Games
Brian Hu Zhang, Ioannis Anagnostides, Kiriaki Fragkia +2
The proper equilibrium, introduced by Myerson (1978), is a classic refinement of the Nash equilibrium that has been referred to as the "mother of all refinements." For normal-form…
The Complexity of Equilibrium Refinements in Potential Games
Ioannis Anagnostides, Maria-Florina Balcan, Kiriaki Fragkia +3
The complexity of computing equilibrium refinements has been at the forefront of algorithmic game theory research, but it has remained open in the seminal class of potential games;…
Revenue-Optimal Efficient Mechanism Design with General Type Spaces
Siddharth Prasad, Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm
We derive the revenue-optimal efficient (welfare-maximizing) mechanism in a general multidimensional mechanism design setting when type spaces -- that is, the underlying domains fr…
Weakest Bidder Types and New Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auctions
Siddharth Prasad, Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm
Core-selecting combinatorial auctions are popular auction designs that constrain prices to eliminate the incentive for any group of bidders -- with the seller -- to renegotiate for…
Learning in Structured Stackelberg Games
Maria-Florina Balcan, Kiriaki Fragkia, Keegan Harris
We initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual information can be predictive of the f…