11 citations · 22 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
18 papers
On the Envy-free Allocation of Chores
Lang Yin, Ruta Mehta
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible chores to three agents, among whom two have additive cost functions, in a fair manner. Two fairness notions under considerat…
Competitive Equilibrium with Chores: Combinatorial Algorithm and Hardness
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Peter McGlaughlin +1
We study the computational complexity of finding a competitive equilibrium (CE) with chores when agents have linear preferences. CE is one of the most preferred mechanisms for allo…
(Almost) Envy-Free, Proportional and Efficient Allocations of an Indivisible Mixed Manna
Vasilis Livanos, Ruta Mehta, Aniket Murhekar
We study the problem of finding fair and efficient allocations of a set of indivisible items to a set of agents, where each item may be a good (positively valued) for some agents a…
Polynomial Time Algorithms to Find an Approximate Competitive Equilibrium for Chores
Shant Boodaghians, Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Ruta Mehta
Competitive equilibrium with equal income (CEEI) is considered one of the best mechanisms to allocate a set of items among agents fairly and efficiently. In this paper, we study th…
Improving EFX Guarantees through Rainbow Cycle Number
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Kurt Mehlhorn +2
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) is arguably the most compelling f…
Competitive Allocation of a Mixed Manna
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Peter McGlaughlin +1
We study the fair division problem of allocating a mixed manna under additively separable piecewise linear concave (SPLC) utilities. A mixed manna contains goods that everyone like…