6 citations · 14 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
14 papers · 1 filter
Competitive Equilibrium with Chores: Combinatorial Algorithm and Hardness
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Peter McGlaughlin +1
We study the computational complexity of finding a competitive equilibrium (CE) with chores when agents have linear preferences. CE is one of the most preferred mechanisms for allo…
Fair and Efficient Allocations of Chores under Bivalued Preferences
Jugal Garg, Aniket Murhekar, John Qin
We study the problem of fair and efficient allocation of a set of indivisible chores to agents with additive cost functions. We consider the popular fairness notion of envy-freenes…
On Fair and Efficient Allocations of Indivisible Public Goods
Jugal Garg, Pooja Kulkarni, Aniket Murhekar
We study fair allocation of indivisible public goods subject to cardinality (budget) constraints. In this model, we have n agents and m available public goods, and we want to selec…
Approximating Equilibrium under Constrained Piecewise Linear Concave Utilities with Applications to Matching Markets
Jugal Garg, Yixin Tao, László A. Végh
We study the equilibrium computation problem in the Fisher market model with constrained piecewise linear concave (PLC) utilities. This general class captures many well-studied spe…
Improving EFX Guarantees through Rainbow Cycle Number
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Kurt Mehlhorn +2
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) is arguably the most compelling f…
Approximating Nash Social Welfare under Rado Valuations
Jugal Garg, Edin Husic, Laszlo A. Vegh
We consider the problem of approximating maximum Nash social welfare (NSW) while allocating a set of indivisible items to agents. The NSW is a popular objective that provides a…