activity
20092026
most citedSymmetry Matters for Sizes of Extended Formulations

44 citations · 80 across the 32 of their papers we have counts for

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15 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2026

Sequential Linear Contracts on Matroids

Kanstantsin Pashkovich, Jacob Skitsko, Yun Xing

In this work, we study sequential contracts under matroid constraints. In the sequential setting, an agent can take actions one by one. After each action, the agent observes the st…

cs.GT2025

Multidimensional Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design

Rian Neogi, Kanstantsin Pashkovich, Chaitanya Swamy

In budget-feasible mechanism design, a buyer wishes to procure a set of items of maximum value from self-interested players. We have a valuation function ,…

cs.GT2025

An -approximate budget feasible mechanism for subadditive valuations

Rian Neogi, Kanstantsin Pashkovich, Chaitanya Swamy

In budget-feasible mechanism design, there is a set of items , each owned by a distinct seller. The seller of item incurs a private cost for supplying her i…

cs.GT2024

Linear Contracts for Supermodular Functions Based on Graphs

Kanstantsin Pashkovich, Jacob Skitsko

We study linear contracts for combinatorial problems in multi-agent settings. In this problem, a principal designs a linear contract with several agents, each of whom can decide to…

cs.GT2024

Matroid Bayesian Online Selection

Ian DeHaan, Kanstantsin Pashkovich

We study a class of Bayesian online selection problems with matroid constraints. Consider a vendor who has several items to sell, with the set of sold items being subject to some s…

cs.GT2023

Single Sample Prophet Inequality for Uniform Matroids of Rank 2

Kanstantsin Pashkovich, Alice Sayutina

We study the prophet inequality when the gambler has an access only to a single sample from each distribution. Rubinstein, Wang and Weinberg showed that an optimal guarantee of 1/2…

cs.GT2023

Non-Adaptive Prophet Inequalities for Minor-Closed Classes of Matroids

Kanstantsin Pashkovich, Alice Sayutina

We consider the matroid prophet inequality problem. This problem has been extensively studied in the case of adaptive mechanisms. In particular, there is a tight -competitive me…

cs.GT2022

A Two-Step Approach to Optimal Dynamic Pricing in Multi-Demand Combinatorial Markets

Kanstantsin Pashkovich, Xinyue Xie

Online markets are a part of everyday life, and their rules are governed by algorithms. Assuming participants are inherently self-interested, well designed rules can help to increa…

cs.GT2020

Approximating Stable Matchings with Ties of Bounded Size

Jochen Koenemann, Kanstantsin Pashkovich, Natig Tofigzade

Finding a stable matching is one of the central problems in algorithmic game theory. If participants are allowed to have ties and incomplete preferences, computing a stable matchin…

cs.GT2018

Simple Games versus Weighted Voting Games: Bounding the Critical Threshold Value

Frits Hof, Walter Kern, Sascha Kurz +2

A simple game is given by a set of players and a partition of~ into a set~ of losing coalitions~ with value that is closed under takin…

cs.GT2018

Computing the Nucleolus of Weighted Voting Games in Pseudo-polynomial Time

Kanstantsin Pashkovich

We provide an algorithm for computing the nucleolus for an instance of a weighted voting game in pseudo-polynomial time. This resolves an open question posed by Elkind. et.al. 2007…

cs.GT2018

On the approximability of the stable matching problem with ties of size two

Robert Chiang, Kanstantsin Pashkovich

The stable matching problem is one of the central problems of algorithmic game theory. If participants are allowed to have ties, the problem of finding a stable matching of maximum…

cs.GT2018

Three-dimensional Stable Matching with Cyclic Preferences

Kanstantsin Pashkovich, Laurent Poirrier

We consider the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences, a problem originally proposed by Knuth. Despite extensive study of the problem by experts from di…

cs.GT2018★ 1 cited

On Critical Threshold Value for Simple Games

Kanstantsin Pashkovich

In this note, we show that for every simple game with n players the critical threshold value is at most n/4. This verifies the conjecture of Freixas and Kurz.

cs.GT2018

Computing the Nucleolus of Weighted Cooperative Matching Games in Polynomial Time

Jochen Koenemann, Kanstantsin Pashkovich, Justin Toth

We provide an efficient algorithm for computing the nucleolus for an instance of a weighted cooperative matching game. This resolves a long-standing open question posed in [Faigle,…