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20102025
most citedElectromagnetic fault injection: towards a fault model on a 32-bit microcontroller

203 citations · 320 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for

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Showing cs.CRShow all

6 papers · 1 filter

cs.CR2023★ 5 cited

MAFIA: Protecting the Microarchitecture of Embedded Systems Against Fault Injection Attacks

Thomas Chamelot, Damien Couroussé, Karine Heydemann

Fault injection attacks represent an effective threat to embedded systems. Recently, Laurent et al. have reported that fault injection attacks can leverage faults inside the microa…

cs.CR2021★ 1 cited

Secure Optimization Through Opaque Observations

Son Tuan Vu, Albert Cohen, Karine Heydemann +2

Secure applications implement software protections against side-channel and physical attacks. Such protections are meaningful at machine code or micro-architectural level, but they…

cs.CR2019★ 6 cited

Studying EM Pulse Effects on Superscalar Microarchitectures at ISA Level

Julien Proy, Karine Heydemann, Fabien Majéric +2

In the area of physical attacks, system-on-chip (SoC) designs have not received the same level of attention as simpler micro-controllers. We try to model the behavior of secure sof…

cs.CR2014★ 3 cited

Experimental evaluation of two software countermeasures against fault attacks

Nicolas Moro, Karine Heydemann, Amine Dehbaoui +2

Injection of transient faults can be used as a way to attack embedded systems. On embedded processors such as microcontrollers, several studies showed that such a transient fault i…

cs.CR2014★ 101 cited

Formal verification of a software countermeasure against instruction skip attacks

Nicolas Moro, Karine Heydemann, Emmanuelle Encrenaz +1

Fault attacks against embedded circuits enabled to define many new attack paths against secure circuits. Every attack path relies on a specific fault model which defines the type o…

cs.CR2014★ 203 cited

Electromagnetic fault injection: towards a fault model on a 32-bit microcontroller

Nicolas Moro, Amine Dehbaoui, Karine Heydemann +2

Injection of transient faults as a way to attack cryptographic implementations has been largely studied in the last decade. Several attacks that use electromagnetic fault injection…