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cs.GT2024
On the Distortion of Committee Election with 1-Euclidean Preferences and Few Distance Queries
Dimitris Fotakis, Laurent Gourvès, Panagiotis Patsilinakos
We consider committee election of (out of ) candidates, where the voters and the candidates are associated with locations on the real line. Each voter's card…
cs.GT2010★ 1 cited
Minimum regulation of uncoordinated matchings
Bruno Escoffier, Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot
Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a socially good state. A possible way to cope with selfishness is to compute a de…