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Knightian Robustness from Regret Minimization
Alessandro Chiesa, Silvio Micali, Zeyuan Allen Zhu
We consider auctions in which the players have very limited knowledge about their own valuations. Specifically, the only information that a Knightian player has about the profi…
Knightian Robustness of Single-Parameter Domains
Alessandro Chiesa, Silvio Micali, Zeyuan Allen Zhu
We consider players that have very limited knowledge about their own valuations. Specifically, the only information that a Knightian player has about the profile of true valuat…
Knightian Analysis of the VCG Mechanism in Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions
Alessandro Chiesa, Silvio Micali, Zeyuan Allen Zhu
We consider auctions in which the players have very limited knowledge about their own valuations. Specifically, the only information that a Knightian player has about the profi…
Bridging Utility Maximization and Regret Minimization
Alessandro Chiesa, Silvio Micali, Zeyuan Allen Zhu
We relate the strategy sets that a player ends up with after refining his own strategies according to two very different models of rationality: namely, utility maximization and reg…
Knightian Analysis of the Vickrey Mechanism
Alessandro Chiesa, Silvio Micali, Zeyuan Allen Zhu
We analyze the Vickrey mechanism for auctions of multiple identical goods when the players have both Knightian uncertainty over their own valuations and incomplete preferences. In…
Knightian Auctions
Alessandro Chiesa, Silvio Micali, Zeyuan Allen Zhu
We study single-good auctions in a setting where each player knows his own valuation only within a constant multiplicative factor δ in (0,1), and the mechanism designer knows δ. Th…
Optimal Pricing in Social Networks with Incomplete Information
Wei Chen, Pinyan Lu, Xiaorui Sun +3
In revenue maximization of selling a digital product in a social network, the utility of an agent is often considered to have two parts: a private valuation, and linearly additive…