6 papers
Robust Scale-Free Auctions
Jerry Anunrojwong
We study prior-independent auction design when bidder values are independently and identically distributed and the seller knows only a scale-invariant shape restriction on their di…
Residential Battery Pooling Under Backup Commitments
Jerry Anunrojwong, Baosen Zhang
Residential batteries increasingly serve two roles: they can earn money by arbitraging wholesale prices and providing grid services, and they provide backup power during outages. T…
Social Learning under Platform Influence: Consensus and Persistent Disagreement
Ozan Candogan, Nicole Immorlica, Bar Light +1
Individuals increasingly rely on social networking platforms to form opinions. However, these platforms typically aim to maximize engagement, which may not align with social good.…
Battery Operations in Electricity Markets: Strategic Behavior and Distortions
Jerry Anunrojwong, Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes +1
Battery storage can reduce electricity generation costs by shifting energy across time, but as privately owned batteries become large, they may also be able to exert market power.…
Robust Auction Design with Support Information
Jerry Anunrojwong, Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes
A seller wants to sell an item to buyers. Buyer valuations are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution unknown to the seller; the seller only knows that the support is included in $[a…
On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design
Jerry Anunrojwong, Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes
Classical Bayesian mechanism design relies on the common prior assumption, but such prior is often not available in practice. We study the design of prior-independent mechanisms th…