12 citations · 55 across the 25 of their papers we have counts for
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cs.GT2020
Improved Truthful Mechanisms for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions: Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier
Sepehr Assadi, Thomas Kesselheim, Sahil Singla
We present a computationally-efficient truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders that achieves an -approximation to the maximum w…
cs.GT2019
Improved Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders
Sepehr Assadi, Sahil Singla
A longstanding open problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design is to design computationally-efficient truthful mechanisms for (approximately) maximizing welfare in combinatorial aucti…
cs.GT2019★ 12 cited
Approximation Schemes for a Unit-Demand Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries
Pravesh Kothari, Divyarthi Mohan, Ariel Schvartzman +2
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with items facing a single buyer. We introduce the notion of symmetric menu complexity of a mechanism, which counts the number of distin…