31 citations · 63 across the 39 of their papers we have counts for
24 papers · 1 filter
Interbank Lending Games
Jinyun Tong, Bart de Keijzer, Haoxiang Wang +1
We define and study a lending game to model the interbank money market, in which lending banks strategically allocate their cash to borrowing banks. The interest rate offered by ea…
Blockchain Monetary Policy, Strategic Participation, and the Dynamics of Decentralization
Diodato Ferraioli, Paolo Penna, Manvir Schneider +1
Blockchain systems must navigate a fundamental tradeoff between rewarding capable participants for performance and preserving a sufficiently decentralized distribution of stake. We…
The Effectiveness of Golden Tickets and Wooden Spoons for Budget-Feasible Mechanisms
Bart de Keijzer, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis +1
One of the main challenges in mechanism design is to carefully engineer incentives ensuring truthfulness while maintaining strong social welfare approximation guarantees. But these…
Asymptotic Extinction in Large Coordination Games
Desmond Chan, Bart De Keijzer, Tobias Galla +2
We study the exploration-exploitation trade-off for large multiplayer coordination games where players strategise via Q-Learning, a common learning framework in multi-agent reinfor…
From Competition to Centralization: The Oligopoly in Ethereum Block Building Auctions
Fei Wu, Thomas Thiery, Stefanos Leonardos +1
Block production on the Ethereum blockchain has adopted an auction-based mechanism known as Proposer--Builder Separation (PBS), where validators outsource block creation to builder…
An Algorithmic Theory of Simplicity in Mechanism Design
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
A growing body of work in economics and computation focuses on the trade-off between implementability and simplicity in mechanism design. The goal is to develop a theory that not o…
Algorithms for Claims Trading
Martin Hoefer, Carmine Ventre, Lisa Wilhelmi
The recent banking crisis has again emphasized the importance of understanding and mitigating systemic risk in financial networks. In this paper, we study a market-driven approach…
Willy Wonka Mechanisms
Thomas Archbold, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre
Bounded rationality in mechanism design aims to ensure incentive-compatibility for agents who are cognitively limited. These agents lack the contingent reasoning skills that tradit…
MEV Sharing with Dynamic Extraction Rates
Pedro Braga, Georgios Chionas, Piotr Krysta +3
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has emerged as a new frontier in the design of blockchain systems. In this paper, we propose making the MEV extraction rate as part of the protocol…
Strategic Bidding Wars in On-chain Auctions
Fei Wu, Thomas Thiery, Stefanos Leonardos +1
The Ethereum block-building process has changed significantly since the emergence of Proposer-Builder Separation. Validators access blocks through a marketplace, where block builde…
On the Connection between Greedy Algorithms and Imperfect Rationality
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
The design of algorithms or protocols that are able to align the goals of the planner with the selfish interests of the agents involved in these protocols is of paramount importanc…
Non-Obvious Manipulability for Single-Parameter Agents and Bilateral Trade
Thomas Archbold, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre
A recent line of work in mechanism design has focused on guaranteeing incentive compatibility for agents without contingent reasoning skills: obviously strategyproof mechanisms gua…
Two-way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality
Diodato Ferraioli, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre
The realization that selfish interests need to be accounted for in the design of algorithms has produced many contributions in computer science under the umbrella of algorithmic me…
Social Cost Guarantees in Smart Route Guidance
Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre, Long Tran-Thanh +3
We model and study the problem of assigning traffic in an urban road network infrastructure. In our model, each driver submits their intended destination and is assigned a route to…
On the approximation guarantee of obviously strategyproof mechanisms
Diodato Ferraioli, Adrian Meier, Paolo Penna +1
Catering to the incentives of people with limited rationality is a challenging research direction that requires novel paradigms to design mechanisms and approximation algorithms. O…
Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms maintain the incentive compatibility of agents that are not fully rational. They have been object of a number of studies since their recent…
Obvious Strategyproofness Needs Monitoring for Good Approximations
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
Obvious strategyproofness (OSP) is an appealing concept as it allows to maintain incentive compatibility even in the presence of agents that are not fully rational, e.g., those who…
Towards Better Models of Externalities in Sponsored Search Auctions
Nicola Gatti, Marco Rocco, Paolo Serafino +1
Sponsored Search Auctions (SSAs) arguably represent the problem at the intersection of computer science and economics with the deepest applications in real life. Within the realm o…
Decentralized Dynamics for Finite Opinion Games
Diodato Ferraioli, Paul W. Goldberg, Carmine Ventre
Game theory studies situations in which strategic players can modify the state of a given system, due to the absence of a central authority. Solution concepts, such as Nash equilib…
Combinatorial Auctions without Money
Dimitris Fotakis, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre
Algorithmic Mechanism Design attempts to marry computation and incentives, mainly by leveraging monetary transfers between designer and selfish agents involved. This is principally…
Ranking Games that have Competitiveness-based Strategies
Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg, Piotr Krysta +1
An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a p…
Metastability of Asymptotically Well-Behaved Potential Games
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
One of the main criticisms to game theory concerns the assumption of full rationality. Logit dynamics is a decentralized algorithm in which a level of irrationality (a.k.a. "noise"…
Using Lotteries to Approximate the Optimal Revenue
Paul W. Goldberg, Carmine Ventre
There has been much recent work on the revenue-raising properties of truthful mechanisms for selling goods to selfish bidders. Typically the revenue of a mechanism is compared agai…
On the Approximation Performance of Fictitious Play in Finite Games
Paul W. Goldberg, Rahul Savani, Troels Bjerre Sorensen +1
We study the performance of Fictitious Play, when used as a heuristic for finding an approximate Nash equilibrium of a 2-player game. We exhibit a class of 2-player games having pa…