24 citations · 79 across the 23 of their papers we have counts for
29 papers
Stable Matching: Choosing Which Proposals to Make
Ishan Agarwal, Richard Cole
To guarantee all agents are matched in general, the classic Deferred Acceptance algorithm needs complete preference lists. In practice, preference lists are short, yet stable match…
Selecting a Match: Exploration vs Decision
Ishan Agarwal, Richard Cole, Yixin Tao
In a dynamic matching market, such as a marriage or job market, how should agents balance accepting a proposed match with the cost of continuing their search? We consider this prob…
Non-quasi-linear Agents in Quasi-linear Mechanisms
Moshe Babaioff, Richard Cole, Jason Hartline +2
Mechanisms with money are commonly designed under the assumption that agents are quasi-linear, meaning they have linear disutility for spending money. We study the implications whe…
Balancing the Robustness and Convergence of Tatonnement
Richard Cole, Yixin Tao
A major goal in Algorithmic Game Theory is to justify equilibrium concepts from an algorithmic and complexity perspective. One appealing approach is to identify robust natural dist…
On the Existence of Pareto Efficient and Envy Free Allocations
Richard Cole, Yixin Tao
Envy-freeness and Pareto Efficiency are two major goals in welfare economics. The existence of an allocation that satisfies both conditions has been studied for a long time. Whethe…
A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching
Rediet Abebe, Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis +1
We revisit the well-studied problem of designing mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, where a set of agents needs to be matched to a set of heterogeneous items. Each…