7 papers
How Wasteful is Signaling?
Alex Frankel, Navin Kartik
Signaling is wasteful. But how wasteful? We study the fraction of surplus dissipated in a separating equilibrium. For isoelastic environments, this waste ratio has a simple formula…
Multi-Sender Disclosure with Costs
Navin Kartik, Frances Xu Lee, Wing Suen
We study voluntary disclosure with multiple biased senders who may bear costs for disclosing or concealing their private information. Under relevant assumptions, disclosures are st…
Information Revelation in Constant-Sum Games: Elections and Beyond
Navin Kartik, Francesco Squintani, Katrin Tinn
Do elections aggregate the private information of office-motivated candidates? Our answer stems from a general result for two-player constant-sum Bayesian games with type-independe…
Replacement and Reputation
Navin Kartik, Elliot Lipnowski, Harry Pei
Does electoral replacement ensure that officeholders eventually act in voters' interests? We study a reputational model of accountability. Voters observe incumbents' performance an…
Persuasion with Verifiable Information
Maria Titova, Kun Zhang
This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We c…
Lemonade from Lemons: Information Design and Adverse Selection
Navin Kartik, Weijie Zhong
A seller posts a price for a single object. The seller's and buyer's values may be interdependent. We characterize the set of payoff vectors across all information structures. Simp…