85 citations · 100 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers
Computing Best-Response Strategies in Infinite Games of Incomplete Information
Daniel Reeves, Michael P. Wellman
We describe an algorithm for computing best response strategies in a class of two-player infinite games of incomplete information, defined by payoffs piecewise linear in agents' ty…
Self-Confirming Price Prediction for Bidding in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions
Anna Osepayshvili, Michael P. Wellman, Daniel Reeves +1
Simultaneous ascending auctions present agents with the exposure problem: bidding to acquire a bundle risks the possibility of obtaining an undesired subset of the goods. Auction t…
Constrained Automated Mechanism Design for Infinite Games of Incomplete Information
Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Daniel Reeves, Michael P. Wellman
We present a functional framework for automated mechanism design based on a two-stage game model of strategic interaction between the designer and the mechanism participants, and a…
Price Prediction in a Trading Agent Competition
K. M. Lochner, D. M. Reeves, Y. Vorobeychik +1
The 2002 Trading Agent Competition (TAC) presented a challenging market game in the domain of travel shopping. One of the pivotal issues in this domain is uncertainty about hotel p…