193 citations · 950 across the 37 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
Self-Confirming Price Prediction Strategies for Simultaneous One-Shot Auctions
Michael P. Wellman, Eric Sodomka, Amy Greenwald
Bidding in simultaneous auctions is challenging because an agent's value for a good in one auction may depend on the uncertain outcome of other auctions: the so-called exposure pro…
Computing Best-Response Strategies in Infinite Games of Incomplete Information
Daniel Reeves, Michael P. Wellman
We describe an algorithm for computing best response strategies in a class of two-player infinite games of incomplete information, defined by payoffs piecewise linear in agents' ty…
Self-Confirming Price Prediction for Bidding in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions
Anna Osepayshvili, Michael P. Wellman, Daniel Reeves +1
Simultaneous ascending auctions present agents with the exposure problem: bidding to acquire a bundle risks the possibility of obtaining an undesired subset of the goods. Auction t…
Constrained Automated Mechanism Design for Infinite Games of Incomplete Information
Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Daniel Reeves, Michael P. Wellman
We present a functional framework for automated mechanism design based on a two-stage game model of strategic interaction between the designer and the mechanism participants, and a…
Knowledge Combination in Graphical Multiagent Model
Quang Duong, Michael P. Wellman, Satinder Singh
A graphical multiagent model (GMM) represents a joint distribution over the behavior of a set of agents. One source of knowledge about agents' behavior may come from gametheoretic…
The Structure of Signals: Causal Interdependence Models for Games of Incomplete Information
Michael P. Wellman, Lu Hong, Scott E. Page
Traditional economic models typically treat private information, or signals, as generated from some underlying state. Recent work has explicated alternative models, where signals c…