13 citations · 16 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers
How a Cooperative-Override Circuit Suppresses Nash Play in Large Language Models
Paraskevas V. Lekeas, Giorgos Stamatopoulos
On the named Prisoner's Dilemma under direct prompting, three larger instruction-tuned models, Llama-3-70B, Qwen2.5-32B, and Qwen2.5-72B, lock at full cooperation, the metric's max…
Partition function form games with probabilistic beliefs
Paraskevas V. Lekeas, Giorgos Stamatopoulos
We revisit games in partition function form, i.e. cooperative games where the payoff of a coalition depends on the partition of the entire set of players. We assume that each coali…
Cooperative oligopoly games with boundedly rational firms
Paraskevas V. Lekeas, Giorgos Stamatopoulos
We analyze cooperative Cournot games with boundedly rational firms. Due to cogni- tive constraints, the members of a coalition cannot accurately predict the coalitional structure o…
Cooperative oligopoly games: a probabilistic approach
Paraskevas V. Lekeas, Giorgos Stamatopoulos
We analyze the core of a cooperative Cournot game. We assume that when contemplating a deviation, the members of a coalition assign positive probability over all possible coalition…
Strategic delegation in a sequential model with multiple stages
Paraskevas V. Lekeas, Giorgos Stamatopoulos
We analyze strategic delegation in a Stackelberg model with an arbitrary number, n, of firms. We show that the n-1 last movers delegate their production decisions to managers where…