13 citations · 19 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
An Evolutionary Approach to Coalition Formation
Paraskevas V. Lekeas
In Cooperative Games with Externalities when the members of a set S \subset N of agents wish to deviate they need to calculate their worth. This worth depends on what the non-membe…
Coalitional Beliefs of Cournot Network Agents
Paraskevas V. Lekeas
In Network cooperative games, due to computational complexity issues, agents are not able to base their behavior on the "whole network status" but have to follow certain "beliefs"…
Should I quit using my resource? Modeling Resource Usage through Game Theory
Paraskevas V. Lekeas
Existing web infrastructures have supported the publication of a tremendous amount of resources, and over the past few years Data Resource Usage is an everyday task for millions of…
Cooperative oligopoly games with boundedly rational firms
Paraskevas V. Lekeas, Giorgos Stamatopoulos
We analyze cooperative Cournot games with boundedly rational firms. Due to cogni- tive constraints, the members of a coalition cannot accurately predict the coalitional structure o…
Cooperative oligopoly games: a probabilistic approach
Paraskevas V. Lekeas, Giorgos Stamatopoulos
We analyze the core of a cooperative Cournot game. We assume that when contemplating a deviation, the members of a coalition assign positive probability over all possible coalition…
Strategic delegation in a sequential model with multiple stages
Paraskevas V. Lekeas, Giorgos Stamatopoulos
We analyze strategic delegation in a Stackelberg model with an arbitrary number, n, of firms. We show that the n-1 last movers delegate their production decisions to managers where…