6 papers
Combinatorial Contracts Through Demand Types
Elizabeth Baldwin, Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman +1
In the combinatorial action model of contract design, a principal delegates a complex project to an agent, incentivizing a subset of actions from a ground set of actions, via a…
Information Design With Large Language Models
Paul Duetting, Safwan Hossain, Tao Lin +4
Information design is typically studied through the lens of Bayesian signaling, where signals shape beliefs purely based on their correlation with the true state of the world. Howe…
Succinct Ambiguous Contracts
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Yarden Rashti
Real-world contracts are often ambiguous. While recent work by Dütting, Feldman, Peretz, and Samuelson (EC 2023, Econometrica 2024) demonstrates that ambiguous contracts can yield…
Anonymous Contracts
Johannes Brustle, Paul Duetting, Stefano Leonardi +2
We study a multi-agent contracting problem where agents exert costly effort to achieve individually observable binary outcomes. While the principal can theoretically extract the fu…
The Pseudo-Dimension of Contracts
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Tomasz Ponitka +1
Algorithmic contract design studies scenarios where a principal incentivizes an agent to exert effort on her behalf. In this work, we focus on settings where the agent's type is dr…
Algorithmic Contract Theory: A Survey
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
A contract is an economic tool used by a principal to incentivize one or more agents to exert effort on her behalf, by defining payments based on observable performance measures. A…