1 citations · 1 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
cs.GT2023
A Strategy-proof Mechanism For Networked Housing Markets
Youjia Zhang, Pingzhong Tang
This paper studies a house allocation problem in a networked housing market, where agents can invite others to join the system in order to enrich their options. Top Trading Cycle i…
cs.GT2023
A Truthful Referral Auction Over Networks
Youjia Zhang, Pingzhong Tang
This paper studies a mechanism design problem over a network, where agents can only participate by referrals. The Bulow-Klemberer theorem proposes that expanding the number of part…
cs.GT2023★ 1 cited
Collusion-proof And Sybil-proof Reward Mechanisms For Query Incentive Networks
Youjia Zhang, Pingzhong Tang
This paper explores reward mechanisms for a query incentive network in which agents seek information from social networks. In a query tree issued by the task owner, each agent is r…