3 citations · 4 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
2 papers
econ.TH2023★ 1 cited
A Comparison of Cursed Sequential Equilibrium and Sequential Cursed Equilibrium: Different Concepts of Cursedness in Dynamic Games
Meng-Jhang Fong, Po-Hsuan Lin, Thomas R. Palfrey
Cursed Equilibrium of Eyster and Rabin (2005) has been a leading theory for explaining winner's-curse-type behavior in static Bayesian games, but it faces conceptual limitations wh…
econ.TH2023★ 3 cited
Cursed Sequential Equilibrium
Meng-Jhang Fong, Po-Hsuan Lin, Thomas R. Palfrey
This paper develops a framework to extend the strategic form analysis of cursed equilibrium (CE) developed by Eyster and Rabin (2005) to multi-stage games. The approach uses behavi…