2 citations · 2 across the 1 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
econ.TH2023★ 2 cited
The structure of strategy-proof rules
Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, Marc Vorsatz
We establish that all strategy-proof social choice rules in strict preference domains follow necessarily a two-step procedure. In the first step, agents are asked to reveal some sp…
econ.TH2023
Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, Oihane Gallo, Marc Vorsatz
We analyze the problem of locating a public facility in a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences when the social planner knows the type of preference (single-peaked…
econ.TH2023
Solidarity to achieve stability
Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, Oihane Gallo, Elena Inarra +1
Agents may form coalitions. Each coalition shares its endowment among its agents by applying a sharing rule. The sharing rule induces a coalition formation problem by assuming that…