3 papers
cs.AI2026
From Admission to Invariants: Measuring Deviation in Delegated Agent Systems
Marcelo Fernandez
Autonomous agent systems are governed by enforcement mechanisms that flag hard constraint violations at runtime. The Agent Control Protocol identifies a structural limit of such sy…
cs.LO2026
Atomic Decision Boundaries: A Structural Requirement for Guaranteeing Execution-Time Admissibility in Autonomous Systems
Marcelo Fernandez
Autonomous systems increasingly execute actions that directly modify shared state, creating an urgent need for precise control over which transitions are permitted to occur. Existi…
econ.TH2025
Regret-free truth-telling voting rules
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustin G. Bonifacio, Marcelo Ariel Fernandez
We study the ability of different classes of voting rules to induce agents to report their preferences truthfully, if agents want to avoid regret. First, we show that regret-free t…