3 citations · 9 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers
Calibrated Click-Through Auctions: An Information Design Approach
Dirk Bergemann, Paul Duetting, Renato Paes Leme +1
We analyze the optimal information design in a click-through auction with fixed valuations per click, but stochastic click-through rates. While the auctioneer takes as given the au…
Computing Walrasian Equilibria: Fast Algorithms and Structural Properties
Renato Paes Leme, Sam Chiu-wai Wong
We present the first polynomial time algorithm for computing Walrasian equilibrium in an economy with indivisible goods and \emph{general} buyer valuations having only access to an…
Price Competition, Fluctuations, and Welfare Guarantees
Moshe Babaioff, Renato Paes Leme, Balasubramanian Sivan
In various markets where sellers compete in price, price oscillations are observed rather than convergence to equilibrium. Such fluctuations have been empirically observed in the r…
Clinching Auctions Beyond Hard Budget Constraints
Gagan Goel, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme
Constraints on agent's ability to pay play a major role in auction design for any setting where the magnitude of financial transactions is sufficiently large. Those constraints hav…
Price Competition in Online Combinatorial Markets
Moshe Babaioff, Noam Nisan, Renato Paes Leme
We consider a single buyer with a combinatorial preference that would like to purchase related products and services from different vendors, where each vendor supplies exactly one…
On the Efficiency of the Walrasian Mechanism
Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan +1
Central results in economics guarantee the existence of efficient equilibria for various classes of markets. An underlying assumption in early work is that agents are price-takers,…
Pricing Public Goods for Private Sale
Michal Feldman, David Kempe, Brendan Lucier +1
We consider the pricing problem faced by a seller who assigns a price to a good that confers its benefits not only to its buyers, but also to other individuals around them. For exa…
Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Information
Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg, Renato Paes Leme
The buying and selling of information is taking place at a scale unprecedented in the history of commerce, thanks to the formation of online marketplaces for user data. Data provid…
Polyhedral Clinching Auctions and the Adwords Polytope
Gagan Goel, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme
A central issue in applying auction theory in practice is the problem of dealing with budget-constrained agents. A desirable goal in practice is to design incentive compatible, ind…