8 papers
Satisficing Equilibrium
Bary S. R. Pradelski, Bassel Tarbush
In a satisficing equilibrium each agent plays one of her top actions in response to the actions of the other agents. Our concept unifies models of bounded rationality and…
Minimizing Volatility: Optimal Adjustment with Evolving Feasibility Constraints
Simon Jantschgi, Heinrich H. Nax, Bary S. R. Pradelski +1
Minimizing volatility and adjustment costs is of central importance in many economic environments, yet it is often complicated by evolving feasibility constraints. We study a decis…
The Computational Intractability of Not Worst Responding
Mete Åeref Ahunbay, Paul W. Goldberg, Edwin Lock +3
Finding, counting, or determining the existence of Nash equilibria, where players must play optimally given each others' actions, are known to be computational intractable problems…
Correlation of Rankings in Matching Markets
Rémi Castera, Patrick Loiseau, Bary S. R. Pradelski
We study the role of correlation in matching markets, where multiple decision-makers simultaneously face selection problems from the same pool of candidates. We propose a model in…
On the existence of pure epsilon-equilibrium
Bary S. R. Pradelski, Bassel Tarbush
We show that for any , as the number of agents gets large, the share of games that admit a pure -equilibrium converges to 1. Our result holds even for pure -equilibri…
Characterizing the Convergence of Game Dynamics via Potentialness
Martin Bichler, Davide Legacci, Panayotis Mertikopoulos +2
Understanding the convergence landscape of multi-agent learning is a fundamental problem of great practical relevance in many applications of artificial intelligence and machine le…