6 papers
BayesL: a Logical Framework for the Verification of Bayesian Networks
Stefano M. Nicoletti, E. Moritz Hahn, Mariëlle Stoelinga
Modern explainable AI still struggles with a fundamental gap: although Bayesian networks (BNs) provide transparent probabilistic structure, there is no unified way to formally expr…
How hard can it be? Quantifying MITRE attack campaigns with attack trees and cATM logic
Stefano M. Nicoletti, Milan Lopuhaä-Zwakenberg, Mariëlle Stoelinga +2
The landscape of cyber threats grows more complex by the day. Advanced Persistent Threats carry out attack campaigns - e.g. operations Dream Job, Wocao, and WannaCry - against whic…
PFL: a Probabilistic Logic for Fault Trees
Stefano M. Nicoletti, Milan Lopuhaä-Zwakenberg, E. Moritz Hahn +1
Safety-critical infrastructures must operate in a safe and reliable way. Fault tree analysis is a widespread method used for risk assessment of these systems: fault trees (FTs) are…
Querying Attack-Fault-Defense Trees: Property Specification in Smart Grid and Aerospace Case Studies
Reza Soltani, Stefano M. Nicoletti, Milan Lopuhaä-Zwakenberg +1
This paper introduces AFDL, a logic-based framework for reasoning about safety, security, and defense interactions in Attack-Fault-Defense Trees, which is a model that captures all…
An ontological lens on attack trees: Toward adequacy and interoperability
Ãtalo Oliveira, Stefano M. Nicoletti, Gal Engelberg +3
Attack Trees (AT) are a popular formalism for security analysis. They are meant to display an attacker's goal decomposed into attack steps needed to achieve it and compute certain…
WATCHDOG: an ontology-aWare risk AssessmenT approaCH via object-oriented DisruptiOn Graphs
Stefano M. Nicoletti, E. Moritz Hahn, Mattia Fumagalli +2
When considering risky events or actions, we must not downplay the role of involved objects: a charged battery in our phone averts the risk of being stranded in the desert after a…