48 citations · 77 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
Showing 2021Show all
2 papers · 1 filter
econ.GN2021★ 48 cited
Decentralizing Centralized Matching Markets: Implications from Early Offers in University Admissions
Julien Grenet, YingHua He, Dorothea Kübler
The matching literature often recommends market centralization under the assumption that agents know their own preferences and that their preferences are fixed. We find counterevid…
econ.EM2021★ 11 cited
Identification and Estimation in Many-to-one Two-sided Matching without Transfers
YingHua He, Shruti Sinha, Xiaoting Sun
In a setting of many-to-one two-sided matching with non-transferable utilities, e.g., college admissions, we study conditions under which preferences of both sides are identified w…