15 citations · 18 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
econ.TH2023
Persuasion in Veto Bargaining
Jenny S Kim, Kyungmin Kim, Richard Van Weelden
We consider the classic veto bargaining model but allow the agenda setter to engage in persuasion to convince the veto player to approve her proposal. We fully characterize the opt…
econ.TH2022★ 3 cited
Pandora's Ballot Box: Electoral Politics of Direct Democracy
Peter Buisseret, Richard Van Weelden
We study how office-seeking parties use direct democracy to shape elections. A party with a strong electoral base can benefit from using a binding referendum to resolve issues that…
econ.TH2020★ 15 cited
Delegation in Veto Bargaining
Navin Kartik, Andreas Kleiner, Richard Van Weelden
A proposer requires the approval of a veto player to change a status quo. Preferences are single peaked. Proposer is uncertain about Vetoer's ideal point. We study Proposer's optim…